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1 Introduction 
The resurgence of private capital flows to developing countries has been a key issue in 
the latest debates about the choice of exchange rate regime. This is perhaps most 
evident in the vast literature prompted by the currency crises of the 1990s. But there has 
also been a concern for the short-term stabilizing properties of alternative regimes, 
given the observed volatility of foreign investment even in non-crisis situations (see, 
e.g., Gavin et al. 1996, and Galindo and Izquierdo 2003). 
Flexible exchange rates can be a useful tool to deal with the volatility of capital flows. 
They facilitate the necessary adjustment in relative prices and the current account 
balance after a change in the availability of foreign resources (see, e.g., Hausmann et al. 
1995, or more recently Rodrik 2001). And they do so without the loss of credibility 
typically entailed by a government’s decision to discretely devalue the currency within 
the rules of a fixed but adjustable peg system. In addition, flexible rates give domestic 
monetary authorities the possibility to actively engage in stabilization policies. 
The recent wave of crises in developing countries has shown, however, that exchange 
rate fluctuations can be harmful for an economy with large amounts of uncovered debt 
(see Calvo and Reinhart 2002, and Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999). A (real) currency 
depreciation, in particular, tends to erode the balance sheet position of firms carrying 
debts denominated in a foreign currency; this reduces their ability to obtain credit and, if 
strong enough, may even result in widespread bankruptcy. Difficulties in the corporate 
sector can thus extend to banks. Since fixed rates also have obvious shortcomings as 
part of the adjustment process to fluctuations in foreign investment, sceptical views are 
beginning to emerge regarding the stabilizing properties of alternative exchange regimes 
by themselves (see Calvo and Mishkin 2003, and Devereux and Lane 2003). 
Among developing countries, Mexico became a major destination for international 
capital flows in the early 1990s. As is well known, these flows can be a source of large 
macroeconomic shocks. In the case of Mexico, they have at times reached levels of 
more than 10 per cent of GDP (see Ros and Bouillon 2002).1 The composition of flows 
has changed over time. Initially, in the context of a system characterized by a semi-fixed 
exchange rate between the Mexican peso and the US dollar, foreign investment in the 
bond and stock markets was by far the most dynamic component. 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) of 1994, and the shift to a 
floating exchange regime forced by a currency crisis in December of that year, marked 
the beginning of a new period, in which foreign direct investment (FDI) became again 
the most significant source of foreign capital. Other types of flows have been 
comparatively small in cumulative terms, mirroring what appears to be a trend among 
developing countries (see Levy-Yeyati et al. 2002). However, they have been quite 
volatile, and in a given quarter they can be as large as FDI. 
                                                 
1    Bosworth (2002: figure 1) shows, however, that despite the recent boom, capital flows (as a 
proportion of GDP) to developing economies in Latin America and Asia have been at most of a 
magnitude similar to that of flows to OECD countries.   2
Given this background, the purpose of this paper is to study the short-term effects of 
capital flows on aggregate demand in Mexico, and to determine whether the sign or 
intensity of these effects has depended on the type of exchange rate regime in operation. 
In addition, we are interested in identifying some of the specific channels through which 
capital flows have affected domestic demand. 
Early in the analysis, total capital flows were separated into two components: FDI and 
the rest. The presumption was that, given their different nature (in terms of degree of 
volatility and their specific transmission channels to the rest of the economy), their 
impact on aggregate demand would also be different. This presumption was later on 
validated, in the sense that it was not possible to find a significant short-run effect of 
FDI on aggregate demand.2 For this reason, this paper focuses on the macroeconomic 
impact of non-FDI flows only. 
Other aspects of the approach followed in the paper can be noted. First, on the demand 
side a distinction is made between consumption and investment. This decision was 
originally motivated by the well known fact that these two components of aggregate 
demand differ significantly in their degree of volatility. As will become clear 
throughout the paper, this separation yielded interesting results. 
Second, the sample was divided into two basic periods: 1990Q1-1994Q3, when the 
country had a semi-fixed exchange rate system (initially a crawling peg, which was 
replaced in November 1991 by an explicit band with a fixed floor, a crawling ceiling, 
and a very narrow intervention band); and 1995Q1-2002Q2, characterized by the 
existence of a floating regime. In the rest of the paper, these will be referred to simply 
as the band and floating periods.3 
Finally, to focus on short-term effects, the series used in the analysis were de-trended, 
using a Hodrick-Prescott filter (lambda=1600); after this, quarter effects were removed 
by means of a regression with a constant and quarterly dummies. Table 2 on volatility is 
the exception, where it was decided to use the original data to calculate the coefficients 
of variation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 has two parts. The first describes 
the evolution of capital flows to Mexico, looking for potential breaks after the 
introduction of the floating system. The second part brings in aggregate demand. It 
shows that after the shift to float, there was a rise in the volatility of both non-FDI flows 
and demand. The link between these two variables in the new regime has evolved 
differently depending on the specific component of demand: the correlation of capital 
flows with consumption has persisted, and may have even become stronger in 
                                                 
2   This result obtained even during the floating period, despite the concurrent rise of acquisitions (as 
opposed to greenfield investments) in total FDI pointed out by Ffrench-Davis and Ocampo (2001) for 
Latin America in general, and by Mattar et al. (2002) for Mexico. It could have been expected that 
acquisitions had a significant effect on aggregate demand to the extent that they are intermediated by 
domestic financial markets [see, e.g., Trigueros’ (1998) discussion of the Mexican case]. 
3   The floating system was introduced in December of 1994, after the band regime collapsed under a 
series of speculative attacks against the peso. As explained below, the ensuing crisis period (1994Q4-
1995Q4) is kept separated in much of the analysis.   3
comparison with the band period; in contrast, the correlation with investment has tended 
to vanish, particularly as the crisis period and its aftermath are left behind. 
Section 3 uses regression analysis to explore more formally the transmission of 
variations in capital flows to domestic demand. The analysis confirms that while the 
effect of capital flows on consumption has become stronger in the new regime, the 
effect on investment is no longer significant. It also identifies the real exchange rate and 
the stock market price index as important transmission channels for capital flows. 
Section 4 presents the conclusions. It is remarked that since the real exchange rate and 
stock market prices are major determinants of investment, the observed fall in their 
correlation with capital flows may explain, at least in part, the detachment of investment 
from capital flows during the floating period. 
2  The evolution of capital flows and aggregate demand 
The precise delimitation of the regime periods used in this paper may require some 
explanation. The surge in non-FDI flows to Mexico started around the first quarter of 
1990, which defines the first observation in our sample.4 The actual shift to float took 
place in the final days of December 1994, in the early stage of what would later become 
a full-blown macroeconomic crisis. There was strong financial instability both before 
and after the floatation of the currency, and for some time fiscal and monetary policies 
were oriented basically toward the goal of stabilizing the domestic financial markets. 
This, and in general the adjustment to the reversal of capital flows ended up causing a 
dramatic fall in aggregate demand precisely as the new exchange system was being 
implemented. 
An assessment of the relative performance of the semi-fixed and floating regimes 
should probably leave the crisis observations aside, but there is the question of when 
exactly to mark the start and end of the crisis. It seems sensible to let the last quarter of 
1994, when a very large decline in non-FDI flows took place, to mark the beginning of 
the crisis period. 
Identifying the end is more problematic. After a strong currency depreciation following 
the abandonment of the band system, stability in the exchange market was restored 
toward the end of the first quarter of 1995. Other variables suggest a longer period of 
abnormally bad economic performance: the nominal interest rate, for instance, reached a 
peak of 60.4 per cent in the second semester (followed by a maximum level of 48.7 per 
cent in the inflation rate two quarters later), while aggregate consumption and 
investment were still experiencing declines in absolute terms in the third quarter. Given 
these observations, it was decided to mark the end of the crisis period in the fourth 
quarter of 1995. 
Another issue is the 2001 acquisition of Banamex, one of Mexico’s largest banks, by 
Citigroup (see CEPAL 2002). As a result of this operation, FDI recorded an extremely 
large positive value (more than 10 standard deviations from the floating period mean) in 
                                                 
4   The late 1980s were a period of strong macroeconomic instability, with annualized inflation rates of 
more than 100 per cent during most of 1987 and 1988.   4
the third quarter of that year; something similar happened to non-FDI flows, but with a 
negative sign. This single observation has a large influence on the estimated levels of 
volatility of capital flows (as shown below, in Table 2, by the alternative coefficients of 
variation) and their correlation with other macroeconomic variables. For this reason, the 
correlation coefficients presented below were calculated for a sample ending in the 
second quarter of 2001, while the regression analysis of the next section, using a larger 
sample period, includes a dummy that takes a value of one in the third quarter of that year. 
2.1 Capital  flows 
As explained, in this paper capital flows to Mexico are split into two parts, namely, FDI 
and other types of investment. The latter category corresponds to the overall capital 
account balance net of direct investment (KANDI), and consists generally of bond and 
stock market investments, and bank loans (the precise definition of all variables used in 
the paper can be consulted in Table 1).5 
Table 1 Definition of variables 
KA  Capital account balance (central bank's definition), in USD billions. a/ 
FDI  Direct investments by foreign firms in Mexico, in USD billions. a/ 
KANDI  Capital account balance less FDI, in USD billions. a/ 
CONS  Total private consumption, in billions of pesos at 1993 prices. b/ 
INVEST  Total investment, in billions of pesos at 1993 prices. b/ 
GDP  Gross domestic product, in billions of pesos at 1993 prices. b/ 
NIR  Average nominal 28-day Treasury bill rate (Cete rate), in percent annual terms. a/ 
INF  4-quarter percentage variation in the consumer price index. a/ 
RIR  Real interest rate, calculated as NIR-INF. 
NER 
Nominal spot exchange rate, pesos per dollar, for wholesale operations; average of 
daily quotations. a/ 
RER  Ratio between US and Mexican consumer price indexes, in a common currency. c/ 
RER2  Ratio between manufacturing and construction price indexes. b/ 
MB  Average of the end-of-month money base stock, divided by CPI and real GDP. d/ 
M1 
Average of end-of-month money supply (coins outside banks plus deposits in 
checking and demand bank accounts), divided by average CPI and by real GDP. d/ 
SPI 
Average of the minimum and maximum monthly values of the general price index for 
the Mexican Stock Exchange, divided by the CPI. e/ 
GOVD 
Federal government total expenditure less total revenue, originally in millions of pesos, 
divided by GDP, in %. e/ 
FXRV  Variation in foreign exchange reserves, from the balance of payments, USD billions. a/ 
CA  Current account balance, in USD billions. a/ 
a/ Source: Banco de México. 
b/ Source: Mexico's National Accounts System, National Institute of Statistics (INEGI). 
c/ Source for US CPI: International Monetary Fund, IFS. 
d/ Nominal monetary aggregates in millions of pesos. Source: Banco de México. 
e/ Source: INEGI data bank. 
                                                 
5   Mexican balance of payments data, as reported by Banco de México, shows zero Mexican direct 
investment abroad, except for the second and third quarters of 2001. These two observations are 
included in the KANDI series.   5
Figure 1 presents the evolution of capital flows since 1985. It does so in terms of the 
average value of FDI and KANDI for different sub-periods: the second half of the 
1980s, before the capital surge; and the periods of band (1990Q1-1994Q3), crisis 
(1994Q4-1995Q4), and floating (1996Q1-2002Q2). Table 2, on the other hand, presents 
basic descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, and coefficient of variation) for a 
set of macroeconomic variables used throughout the paper, distinguishing again 
between the band and floating periods. 
































Excludes 2001Q3. Definition and source of variables, see Table 1. 
A first characteristic of Mexico’s recent experience is that the relative importance of the 
different types of foreign investment6 has changed over time, with significant brakes in 
1990 (when large amounts of private capital started flowing in), and again after the 
currency crisis of December 1994. As Figure 1 shows, toward the end of the 1980s FDI 
was the only significant source of foreign capital for the country; in fact, KANDI was 
negative on average. This situation changed after 1990 when, despite a doubling in the 
size of average FDI, other types of investment became the most dynamic component of 
total inflows, by far. As a result, during the band period KANDI came to represent 69 
per cent of the overall capital account surplus; 52.2 per cent of these inflows 
corresponded to bond market investments, 27.7 per cent to stock purchases, and 20.7 
per cent to bank loans.7 
                                                 
6   In this paper, the term foreign investment is used in a wide sense, including not only direct and 
portfolio investments but also bank loans. 
7   These figures exclude the second quarter of 1992, when the total amount was negative because of 
large loan repayments.   6
Table 2 Basic macroeconomic indicators 
   Band period (90Q1-94Q3)    Floating period (96Q1-02Q2) 
   Mean  SD  CV    Mean  SD  CV 
KA 5.7896  2.8793  49.73    3.9469  2.5358  64.25 
KANDI 4.4514  2.7873  62.62   0.3887  3.2874 845.86 
KANDI a/          0.8366  2.4130  288.43 
FDI 1.3382  0.8488  63.43    3.5494  2.4021  67.68 
FDI     a/          3.1115  0.9046  29.07 
CONS 874.71  54.92  6.28    1020.30  106.95  10.48 
INVEST 225.11  21.39  9.50    283.92  43.97  15.49 
GDP 1218.90  63.55  5.21    1482.33  122.33  8.25 
CONS    b/  4.3284  2.7426  63.36    4.7040  3.1854  67.72 
INVEST  b/  8.1009  6.9464  85.75   9.4182  10.9631  116.40 
GDP       b/  3.7962  1.5759  41.51    4.1672  3.1937  76.64 
NIR 19.97  8.92  44.67    19.60  8.36  42.67 
INF 16.83  7.76  46.10    16.44  10.30  62.66 
RIR 3.1391  6.6522  211.91   3.1624  5.1962  164.31 
NER 3.0560  0.1683  5.51    8.8699  0.8270  9.32 
RER 12.6177  1.2063  9.56    13.0503  1.5544  11.91 
RER2 10.9736  1.1872  10.82    9.0269  1.0883  12.06 
SPI 369.00  122.62  33.23    399.51  46.62  11.67 
MB 1.1776  0.0512  4.35    1.0827  0.1119  10.33 
M1 3.2405  1.0083  31.11    3.3036  0.3125  9.46 
FXRV 432.29  2556.35  591.35   1037.77  1496.96  144.25 
CA -4847.43  2075.64  -42.82    -3181.64  1713.43  -53.85 
SD = Standard Deviation, CV = Coefficient of Variation, in %. 
a/ Excluding the third quarter of 2001. 
b/ In 4-quarter growth rates. Definition of variables, see Table 1. 
 
This trend was interrupted by the crisis of late 1994 and 1995 when, in a context of 
steady FDI expansion, other types of investment practically came to a halt. Even after 
the crisis was overcome, non-FDI flows have remained a secondary source of foreign 
resources for the country. For instance, during the 1996Q1-2002Q2 period, KANDI 
registered a quarterly average value of only 0.8 billions of dollars, well below the 3.1 
billions of FDI (see again Figure 1). 
A second characteristic is that the volatility of capital flows has also changed over time, 
with an intensity and direction that depend on the type of flow (see Table 2). During the 
band period, the volatility of our two basic categories of foreign investment, measured 
by the coefficient of variation, was basically the same: 63.4 per cent for FDI and 62.6 
per cent for KANDI. After the adoption of floating, the overall volatility of capital flows 
increased, as shown by the rise in the coefficient of variation of the capital account 
balance (KA), which changed from 49.7 to 64.3 per cent. Actually, however, this 
upward shift is a summary of divergent tendencies between direct and the other types of 
investment: the coefficient of variation of FDI declined from 63.4 to 29.1 per cent; 
meanwhile, the coefficient for KANDI rose from 62.6 to 288.4 per cent.   7


























Excludes 2001Q3. Definition and source of variables, see Table 1. 
These trends in volatility are an important part of Mexico’s recent macroeconomic 
setting: although non-FDI flows have been relatively small on average, they can, on a 
given quarter, be as large as (or larger than) FDI. This is shown in Figure 2, which 
presents the actual quarterly value of the FDI and KANDI flows since 1985 (as opposed 
to the period averages presented in Figure 1). 
Mexico’s stylized facts can be put in an international context. A view widely held after 
the currency crises of the 1990s, is that systems with relatively fixed exchange rates tend 
to encourage excessive foreign portfolio investments because of an implicit government 
guarantee against currency risk. By removing such guarantee, floating regimes are 
expected to reduce the size of inflows.8 In the light of the Mexican experience, it could be 
wondered whether the introduction of (greater) exchange rate flexibility has been a factor 
in making non-FDI flows not only smaller but also more volatile. 
Table 3 summarizes the recent behaviour of non-FDI flows to a group of large 
recipients of foreign capital in Latin America. It is apparent that the two basic 
characteristics of flows to Mexico, namely, a decline in average size and larger 
volatility, are shared by all countries. There is no simple connection with the exchange 
regime. Throughout our two reference periods, Argentina had a fixed exchange rate 
system, Brazil didn’t shift from fixed to flexible until early 1999, Chile had a basically 
flexible rate—most of the time, within a crawling band—and Peru a system of managed 
floating. In every case, though, there is a fall in the average size and an increase in the 
coefficient of variation as we move from the early to the late 1990s. 
                                                 
8   See Furman and Stiglitz (1998) for an early discussion of this issue.   8
Table 3 Non-FDI flows to Latin American countries. a/ 
  Mexico's band period      Mexico's floating period 
   Sample  Mean  SD  CV    Sample  Mean  SD  CV 
Argentina 90Q1-94Q3  113.47  396.25 349.22   96Q1-01Q2 88.12 423.10 480.13 
Brazil 90Q1-94Q3  46.74  495.66 1060.58   96Q1-01Q4  -25.83  1347.04  -5215.89 
Chile 91Q1-94Q3  145.63  170.17 116.85    96Q1-01Q3  61.37  338.71  551.90 
Mexico 90Q1-94Q3  266.06  160.84 60.45    96Q1-01Q4  45.40  146.43  322.54 
Peru 91Q4-94Q3  115.04  124.21 107.98    96Q1-00Q4  86.34  288.38  333.99 
SD=Standard deviation, CV=Coefficient of variation, in %. 
a/ Financial account balance less net foreign direct investment, IMF definitions. Original in USD millions. 
US CPI-deflated. Re-scaled such that the average for 1990Q1-2001Q4 (or available sample) equals 100. 
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF. 
 
This evidence suggests that the currency uncertainty brought about by the introduction 
of a floating system is not a necessary condition for a reduction in the size or an 
increase in the volatility of capital flows.9 But a basic question does remain, namely, to 
what extent has the floating system protected the real side of Mexico’s economy from 
the observed fluctuations in capital flows? 
2.2 Aggregate  demand 
There are important aspects of Mexico’s macroeconomic performance that do not seem 
to depend on the particular choice of currency arrangements (see Table 2 for the 
following figures). Disinflation, for instance, has been a constant across regimes. 
During the band period, the annual inflation rate descended gradually from above 25 per 
cent in 1990 to less than 7 per cent in 1994; in the same way, it declined from more than 
30 per cent in 1996 to below 5 per cent in early 2002. The average inflation rate was 
also quite similar: 16.8 versus 16.4 per cent per year. 
The pace of economic growth does not change much between periods, either, once the 
crisis observations are excluded. In particular, the mean annual GDP growth rate 
(measured as the four-quarter variation in output) increased only slightly, from 3.8 per 
cent to 4.2 per cent, after the shift to float. Perhaps as a reflection of these similarities, 
the real interest rate showed the same level, of about 3.1 per cent, across periods. 
But besides these similarities, there are also important changes in macroeconomic 
performance as we move from band to floating. In particular, there is an increase in the 
volatility of (both the levels and the growth rates of) consumption and investment; 
unsurprisingly, the same pattern is shown by the GDP. The rise in aggregate demand 
volatility can be large. For instance, the coefficient of variation of consumption (in 
levels) increased from 6.28 to 10.48, or by 67 per cent. 
 
                                                 
9   Of course, this pattern is restricted to a small sample of countries during the recent period, and is only 
indicative of the possibility that the observed behavior of capital flows to Mexico, rather than being a 
direct consequence of the choice of regime, is part of a broader international trend. To arrive at a more 
general result would require increasing the sample size and conducting a proper econometric analysis.   9
Table 4 Correlation coefficients for KANDI 
                              BAND (90Q1-94Q3)                                FLOAT (96Q1-01Q2) 
                 KANDI on:                 
     t    t-1    t-2    t-3       t    t-1    t-2    t-3 
CONS  --   0.4790 **   0.4361 *  --     0.3899 *   0.5132 **   0.3695 *  -- 
INVEST  --  --   0.3898 *   0.5703 *** a/   0.5004 **  --  --  -- 
NIR  -0.4298 *  -0.5013 **  -0.4317 ***  -0.4263 *    --  --  --  -- 
INF  --  -0.4732 **  -0.7464 ***  -0.7496 ***    -0.6098 ***  --  --  -- 
RIR  --  --   0.4763 **   0.4845 **     0.5292 **  --  --  -- 
NER  --  -0.4072 *  -0.7394 ***  -0.7370 ***    -0.3699 **  --  --  -- 
RER  -0.4895 **  -0.5584 **  -0.7077 *** -0.7430  ***   -0.4790 **  --  --  -- 
RER2  --  -0.4064 *  -0.7025 ***  -0.6501 ***    -0.5034 **  -0.4459 **  --  -- 
MB  --  --   0.5102 **   0.3914 **    --   0.5103 **  --  -- 
M1   0.4293 *   0.4266 *   0.6765 ***   0.6691 ***     0.4950 **  --  --  -- 
SPI  --  --   0.5477 **   0.4703 **     0.3377 b/  --  --  -- 
FXRV 1/   0.4332 *  --  --  --     0.6899 ***  --  --  -- 
CA  --  --  -0.5501 **  -0.6448 ***    -0.5195 **  -0.4688 **  --  -- 
GOVD  --  --  --  --    --   0.4295 **  --  -- 
*** (**) [*] = significant at 1% (5%) [10%]. 
a/ p-value is 0.0108; b/ p-value is 0.1242. 
Sample period is defined by observations for the variables in the first column. 
1/ Without trend or quarter effects removed. Definition of variables in Table 1. 
 
Table 4 presents the estimated correlation coefficients between (current and lagged) 
KANDI and a set of macroeconomic variables, again by sub-period. Only those 
coefficients that were statistically significant are included. As the table shows, there is a 
significant, positive correlation between aggregate consumption and non-FDI flows, 
which basically does not change in intensity (or sign) with the choice of exchange 
regime. In particular, the correlation coefficient between these two variables reached a 
level of 0.48 during the band period and a slightly higher of 0.51 in the float, in both 
cases involving the first lag of KANDI. 
Although correlation does not imply causality, the fact that consumption is linked to 
past values of the capital flows suggests the existence of a causal relationship going 
from capital flows to consumption.10 This implies that the greater volatility of non-FDI 
flows would be transmitted to domestic consumption.11 In contrast, the correlation 
                                                 
10    An alternative explanation would be that all of the observed correlation arises because foreign 
investors correctly foresee, say, a reduction in consumption, and react to that expectation by reducing 
in advance their positions in the country. However, the fact that the effect of capital flows on 
consumption tends to disappear after controlling for the influence of variables that presumably act as 
transmission channels, such as the exchange rate (see section 3), lends support to the presumption that 
there is indeed a causal link running from foreign investment to domestic demand. 
11  This finding contradicts the possibility that capital flows stabilize consumption by acting as a bumper 
against fluctuations in domestic income, in line with the conclusions reached in previous studies (see 
Prasad et al. 2003 for references).   10
between capital flows and investment demand has tended to vanish during the floating 
period.12 This set of results motivates the regression analysis of the next section. 
3  The determinants of aggregate demand 
The regression analysis in this section has two basic purposes: first, to confirm the 
existence of a significant effect of capital flows on domestic demand and a possible 
break after the shift to float, as suggested by the evidence provided by the correlation 
coefficients; and second, to identify some of the possible channels for the transmission 
of capital flows to aggregate demand. 
The sample period is 1990Q1-2002Q2, and the sequence of analysis is as follows: the 
starting point is the estimation of a regression equation that includes as right-hand-side 
variables only the lagged value of the dependent variable (consumption or investment), 
a crisis dummy for 1994Q4-1995Q4, the capital flow variable (KANDI), and an 
interaction between the latter and a dummy for the floating period (1995Q1-2002Q2). 
The equation also includes BNX, a dummy that equals one in the third quarter of 2001 
to isolate the spike in KANDI associated to the acquisition of Banamex by Citigroup. 
The second stage involves the estimation of a series of regression equations, each one 
including as an additional regressor a variable that presumably can act as a transmission 
channel from capital flows to consumption or investment. The idea is that, if the 
variable is indeed a significant channel, this should be reflected in a change in the size 
and statistical significance of the capital flow coefficient (see Greene 2002 for a recent 
application of this approach). The underlying assumption is that the effect of non-FDI 
flows on consumption or investment is not direct, but operates through third variables. 
To deal with the possible endogeneity of regressors, 2SLS estimation is carried out 
when current values of the right-hand-side variables are used (otherwise, OLS is used). 
Lags (usually two) of the regressor(s) were included as instruments. Each regression 
equation is accompanied by tests for serial correlation, ARCH errors, Ramsey's 
specification error, and normally distributed residuals. In most cases, diagnostic results 
are fine; any failure is noted in the text. 
3.1  The effects of capital flows 
Initial exploration confirmed two characteristics of the relationship between 
consumption and investment on one side, and non-FDI flows on the other (see Tables 5 
and 6). The first is that there is no significant effect of capital flows on domestic 
demand on a contemporaneous basis, but only when lags are allowed for. It turns out 
that the best fit is obtained using different lag structures for the two reference periods. In 
the case of consumption, the most significant results are obtained when KANDI is 
lagged one quarter in the band period, but two quarters in the floating period (see 
                                                 
12  More specifically, although Table 4 shows that the correlation coefficient between these variables fell 
from 0.57 to 0.50 after the regime change, but remained significant, actually some exploration 
revealed that the correlation during the floating period is not robust; for instance, it is lost if the start 
of the sample is moved forward only one or two quarters.   11
equations 1 and 2, Table 5). In the investment equation, KANDI is lagged three quarters 
in the band period, while all the first three lags are used for the floating period (see 
equations 1 and 2, Table 6). 
A second characteristic of the relationship is that it intensifies as we move from the 
band to the floating period. Using the estimated coefficients for the interactions of 
KANDI with the float dummy, it can be calculated that eventually (i.e., taking into 
account all significant lags) the capital flow coefficient increased by more than 170 per 
cent after the shift to float (from 2.50 to 6.96) in the consumption equation, and by 
nearly 40 per cent (from 2.72 to 3.76) in the investment equation (see equation 2 in 
Tables 5 and 6). These results support the idea that the increased variability of demand 
observed in the recent period was partly driven by the fluctuations in foreign 
investment.13 14 
To better interpret the size of the coefficients, we may consider the following: during 
the band period, the average level of consumption was 874.7 billions of pesos (at 1993 
prices); thus, a one standard deviation in KANDI (2.787 billions of dollars) tended to 
produce a variation of 0.8 per cent in consumption. Using the data in Table 2, it can be 
calculated that a similar KANDI shock tended to cause a variation twice as large in 
aggregate consumption during the floating period. 
There is, however, the possibility that the observed increase in the size of the KANDI 
coefficients is being driven by observations corresponding to the crisis period. The 
equations estimated so far have included a crisis intercept dummy; in a crisis context, 
though, domestic spending may be atypically sensitive to variations in capital flows (for 
instance, because of their impact on private expectations, or because firms and households 
are in a fragile situation in the aftermath of a strong currency depreciation). This would 
lead to slope shifts in the regression equations. To explore this possibility, a new variable, 
defined as the product of KANDI and the crisis dummy, was included, with 
corresponding lags, in the original equations (see equations 3 and 4 in Tables 5 and 6). 
It can be seen that the interaction of KANDI with the crisis dummy is statistically 
significant (at various lags) in both the consumption and investment equations. But the 
implications are different in each case. For consumption, the introduction of the new 
variable does not invalidate the previous conclusion of a rise in the KANDI coefficient 
in the floating period. In fact, the sum of coefficients for the interactions of current 
KANDI and KANDI(-2) with the crisis dummy is not significantly different from zero 
(see the result of the Wald test). 
                                                 
13   There is some previous evidence pointing in this direction. Iwata and Tanner (2003) analyze the 
macroeconomic effects of capital account shocks (within a VAR model) in Mexico, among other 
countries. During 1988-94, the adjustment to such shocks involved mainly variations in international 
reserves; during the floating period, in contrast, it has taken place through a combination of changes in 
reserves, the interest rate and the exchange rate. They conclude that while in the former period capital 
account shocks had no statistically significant effect on output growth, such an effect can in fact be 
detected in the latter period. 
14    It is worth noting that although this first econometric specification is very limited, purposefully 
leaving aside a number of potentially significant macroeconomic determinants of aggregate demand 
(in order to gain later on some insight into the transmission channels), it does however amply pass all 
diagnostic tests.   12
Table 5 Consumption analysis (dependent: CONS; sample period: 1990Q1-2002Q2; 50 observations) 
(Equation) method  (1) OLS  (2) OLS  (3) OLS  (4) OLS  (5) 2SLS  (6) 2SLS  (7) 2SLS  (8) OLS  (9) 2SLS  (10) 2SLS 
INTERCEPT    4.8303 *    4.3469 *    3.8394    3.6869 *   -0.3831    0.8348    2.9252    4.2999 *    6.0557 **    2.1452 
BNX  -44.9770 **  -44.0528 **  -38.5872 **  -39.0450 **  -29.8626  -35.3649 **  -30.6613 *  -41.5741 **  -44.9729 ***  -24.5087 
CRISIS  -10.515   -9.9814   -5.5861     26.0936 *   13.2968   -5.2799  -11.6941  -22.1677 **   -1.3595 
CONS(-1)    0.6600 ***    0.6466 ***    0.5896 ***    0.5915 ***    0.3974 ***    0.5530 ***    0.4984 ***    0.6015 ***    0.3630 ***    0.4370 *** 
KANDI(-1)    2.3215 a/    2.5052 ***    2.3758 b/    2.7280 ***    0.0312    1.5583 *    1.2215    2.5828 ***    2.4178 ***    1.8734 ** 
KANDI(-2)    -0.7538       0.6956          
KANDI(-1)*FLOAT      0.3262     -0.1184          
KANDI(-2)*FLOAT    5.2173 ***    4.4606 ***    2.8371 c/    3.6236 ***    3.9679 ***    3.5286 ***    3.2793 ***    4.8928 ***    4.7698 ***    2.6741 ** 
KANDI*CRISIS      -5.8703  **    -5.2035  **         
KANDI(-1)*CRISIS        1.4078          
KANDI(-2)*CRISIS          5.1445 *    5.9278 ***                   
RER      -17.571  ***        
NIR         -1.5383  **       
SPI            0.2662  ***      
GOVD(-1)         -17.0346  *     
MB          229.1468  **   
GDP                               0.3354 ** 
Adj R-sq    0.7202    0.7311    0.7561    0.7708    0.6494    0.7510    0.7351    0.7448  0.7628    0.8205 
BG 4    0.8986    0.8878    0.3904    0.3925    0.5228    0.9442    0.4939    0.8893  0.8296    0.7205 
ARCH     0.2092    0.2138    0.5692    0.3470    0.5454    0.7374    0.2026    0.3282  0.4321    0.2218 
RESET     0.4848    0.3671    0.8233    0.7085    0.6155    0.9768    0.9210    0.1521  0.7420    0.7341 
JB    0.9920    0.9999    0.6718    0.9530    0.9644    0.4110    0.1751    0.9987  0.4154    0.7031 
Wald             0.7287                   
*** (**) [*]: significant at 1% (5%) [10%] level. a/ p-value is 0.1621; b/ p-value is 0.1290; c/ p-value is 0.1555. 
BG 4 is the Breusch-Godrey LM test for the absence of up to 4th-order serial correlation. ARCH is Engle´s LM test for the absence of 1st-order ARCH errors. 
RESET is an F-test for the absence of Ramsey's specification error. JB is the Jarque-Bera test for normally distributed errors. The null in the Wald test is that the 
sum of coefficients of KANDI*CRISIS and KANDI(-2)*CRISIS is zero. In all cases the p-value for the test is reported.   13
Table 6 Investment analysis (dependent: INVEST; sample period: 1990Q1-2002Q2; 50 observations) 
(Equation) method  (1) OLS  (2) OLS  (3) OLS  (4) OLS  (5) 2SLS  (6) 2SLS  (7) 2SLS  (8) OLS  (9) 2SLS 
INTERCEPT    2.9940 *    2.6891 *    2.1961    1.8980    1.7220    0.6472    3.1692 **    2.8067 **    1.0934 
BNX  -18.4461 *  -18.4043 *  -12.5564 -12.5795 -18.9594  *   -9.3574  -13.1986 **  -19.6483 ***  -12.9674 *** 
CRISIS  -19.0764 ***  -17.8232 ***   -3.1407   -2.2176    6.3007  -12.9864  -17.0700 *  -18.1910 **   -6.3503 
INVEST(-1)    0.6375 ***    0.6294 ***    0.8065 ***    0.7937 ***    0.4584 ***    0.7778 ***    0.5152 ***    0.5853 ***    0.1972 
KANDI(-1)  -0.3651      -0.6551          
KANDI(-2)  -0.6676      -0.4195          
KANDI(-3)    3.0415 ***    2.7154 ***    2.3333 **    2.0530 **   -1.6003    2.8453 ***    0.5832    2.6688 ***    1.4103 * 
KANDI(-1)*FLOAT    2.0079 *    1.6845 ***    0.9491    0.3486    0.7851    1.1850 ** c/    1.3521 **    1.7816 ***    0.6644 
KANDI(-2)*FLOAT    2.2347 ** a/    1.6308 **    0.9116    0.5629    1.8286 **    1.0044 d/    1.4779 **    1.9702 ***   -0.2961 
KANDI(-3)*FLOAT   -2.6576 **   -2.2650 ** b/   -2.9437 **   -2.5844 **    2.1911   -2.5033 **   0.4061   -2.2836 **   -1.4313 * 
KANDI(-1)*CRISIS        5.4524 ***    5.3827 ***           
KANDI(-2)*CRISIS        2.6487 *    2.6423 *           
RER        -10.4784  *        
RIR           -0.7686  **      
SPI               0.1332  **     
GOVD(-1)            -11.8540  **   
GDP                            0.4333 *** 
Adj R-sq  0.8366  0.841    0.8680    0.8707 0.8221  0.8451  0.8586 0.8556  0.9378 
BG 4  0.9321  0.965    0.2639    0.2155  0.7576 0.6142  0.8315 0.8882  0.8377 
ARCH  0.3982  0.5076    0.8689    0.6400 0.577  0.2926  0.2739 0.5983  0.6161 
RESET   0.7517  0.4927    0.1169    0.0873 0.513  0.9906  0.3663 0.4821  0.4798 
JB  0.7129  0.874    0.8963    0.8499  0.1725 0.9947  0.8332 0.1795  0.0596 
Wald             0.8128                
*** (**) [*]: significant at 1% (5%) [10%] level. a/ p-value is 0.0531; b/ p-value is 0.0514; c/ p-value is 0.0560; d/ p-value is 0.1584. 
2SLS estimation uses two lags of the current-value regressor as additional instruments, except equation (9) which uses three lags of GDP.  
For test descriptions, see Table 5. The null in the Wald test is that the sum of the KANDI coefficients (except the interactions with CRISIS) is zero. 
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For investment, though, the initial conclusions do change. In particular, after a shift in 
the KANDI slopes is allowed for during the crisis quarters, only the third lag of KANDI 
remains statistically significant; the result is that the KANDI coefficient changes from 
positive to zero in the floating period. 
The effect of capital flows on investment demand was initially significant, in economic 
terms: it can be easily calculated (from equation 2 in Table 6 and the data in Table 2) 
that a one standard deviation in KANDI during the band period tended to produce a 3.4 
per cent change in investment. This is, as can be recalled, larger than the corresponding 
effect on consumption. After the adoption of floating, this effect was at first larger; 
however, once the crisis period was left behind, the connection between investment and 
capital flows essentially disappeared. 
In the remainder of this section, we will use the original specification, without the 
KANDI*CRISIS interactions, as benchmark, to allow for a richer analysis of the 
transmission channels for capital flows.15 This corresponds to equation (2) in both the 
consumption and investment tables. But then it must be kept in mind that conclusions 
about the transmission to investment during the float are, in fact, valid mainly for the 
initial part of that period. 
3.2 Transmission  channels 
As mentioned before, non-FDI flows are expected to affect aggregate demand levels, 
not directly, but through third variables. In particular, a rise in capital inflows, implying 
a greater world demand for local assets, is likely to bring about an increase in asset 
prices (i.e., an appreciation of the currency, lower domestic interest rates, and higher 
share prices), an expansion of monetary aggregates, and probably a looser stance in 
fiscal policy. These changes, in turn, are likely to affect domestic consumption and 
investment demand.16 
The variables considered in the following analysis are: the real exchange rate (RER or 
RER2)17, the real and nominal interest rates (RIR and NIR, respectively), the output-
adjusted real money base (MB) and money supply (M1), the stock market price index, 
in real terms (SPI), and the federal government’s budget deficit (GOVD) (again, the 
definition of these variables can be consulted in Table 1). 
Exchange rate. A rise in capital inflows that appreciates the currency in nominal terms 
will also result, under some price rigidity, in an appreciation of the real exchange rate. A 
real currency appreciation can have a positive effect on consumption and investment 
demand through several channels: for example, by an increase in the purchasing power 
                                                 
15    Note also that the results from Ramsey's specification test do not support the inclusion of the 
KANDI*CRISIS interactions in the investment equation. 
16    See Gavin et al. (1996), Ocampo (2000), and Montiel and Reinhart (2001), for a discussion of 
transmission channels, and Jansen (2003) for an empirical examination. 
17  RER is the ratio between US and Mexican overall consumer prices, while RER2 corresponds to the 
price ratio between tradable (manufacturing) and non-tradable (construction) goods in Mexico.   15
of workers, a reduction in the cost of imported capital goods,18 or a fall in the domestic 
value of debts denominated in foreign currency (see Ito and Krueger 2001). 
Table 4 shows that indeed there has been a negative correlation between the (nominal 
and real) exchange rate and non-FDI flows in Mexico since 1990. A somewhat 
unexpected finding is that the correlation of capital flows with the exchange rate has 
fallen during the floating period, a result that could be explained by the use of 
international reserves as a sort of macroeconomic bumper against short-run fluctuations 
in capital flows (see Griffith-Jones et al. 2001 for a general discussion of this point). 
This possibility is supported by the observation of a fall in the intensity of the 
correlation between capital flows and the current account deficit under the float (from 
0.64 to 0.52), and by a rise in the correlation between capital flows and foreign 
exchange reserves (from 0.43 to 0.69; see Table 4). 
As expected, the real exchange rate in our consumption and investment equations 
presents a statistically significant, negatively signed coefficient (see equation 5, Tables 
5 and 6).19 From the estimated coefficients and the data in Table 2, it can be calculated 
that a change of one standard deviation in the real exchange rate during the band period 
tended to reduce consumption in 2.4 per cent. The negative effect on investment is 
much stronger, at 5.6 per cent. 
The inclusion of RER as a regressor produces a decline in the size of the KANDI 
coefficient in both equations. There is some differentiation between periods. The 
KANDI coefficient stops being statistically different from zero during the band period, 
but the shift coefficient for the floating period remains significant. The interpretation is 
that the real exchange rate has been a key transmission channel for capital flows during 
the entire sample, but was particularly important in its early part; in fact, no significant 
effect of capital flows on either consumption or investment demand can be detected, 
once the influence of the real exchange rate is controlled for, during the band period. 
The coefficient for the floating period falls in more than 40 per cent in both the 
consumption and investment equations, but remains statistically significant. 
Interest rate. An exogenous rise in the world demand for local bonds is likely to 
produce a decline in local interest rates, although this may be conditioned by the type of 
exchange regime. Table 4 shows that (current and lagged) KANDI and NIR were 
negatively correlated in the early 1990s, but that the association has vanished during the 
floating period. In a sense, this is an expected result: as is well known, monetary 
autonomy under conditions of international mobility of capital is enhanced by a shift to 
a more flexible exchange rate regime. To the extent that aggregate demand depends 
(inversely) on the interest rate, the negative correlation between KANDI and NIR 
during the band period can be a channel for the transmission of capital flows. This will 
be the case in particular if changes in the nominal interest rate are transmitted to the real 
interest rate (RIR). 
                                                 
18 See Agosin (1998) for a formal model and an application to Chile, and Ocampo and Tovar (1998) for 
the Colombian case. 
19  Qualitatively similar results obtain if RER2 is used instead of RER, although RER2 is not statistically 
significant in the investment equation.   16
However, an unexpected result is that the association between non-FDI flows and the 
real interest rate has been highly significant and remained basically unchanged across 
periods (instead of becoming weaker after the shift to float). Moreover, the correlation 
coefficient is positive. This, of course, is explained by a persistent, negatively signed, 
significant correlation between non-FDI flows and inflation.20 The positive correlation 
between non-FDI flows and the real interest rate means that, regardless of the specific 
exchange rate regime in operation, the real interest rate will behave in counter-cyclical 
fashion in relation to capital flows, tempering their effect on economic activity. 
The inclusion of the real interest rate in the investment equation yields the expected 
results, in the sense that the RIR coefficient is statistically significant and negatively 
signed (see equation 6 in Table 6). It can be seen that the new specification has very 
little effect on the KANDI coefficient: for the band period, it in fact increases slightly—
as should be, given the positive correlation between RIR and KANDI—from 2.7 to 2.8 
(compare equations 2 and 6 in Table 6), while its size and significance during the 
floating period are somewhat reduced. 
Initial results for the consumption equation were surprising because the real interest rate 
was not statistically significant. If the nominal interest rate is instead used, then the 
expected negative coefficient is obtained (see equation 6 in Table 5). The inclusion of 
NIR results in a reduction in the size of the KANDI coefficients, of about one third, 
across periods (compare equations 2 and 6); this is consistent with the observed 
negative correlation between KANDI and NIR. In contrast to the equation with the real 
exchange rate, though, the coefficients remain statistically significant. 
Overall, the evidence supports the conclusion that the interest rate has had a relatively 
minor role in the transmission of capital flow fluctuations to aggregate demand, 
particularly so in the case of investment demand. 
Stock market prices. Share prices are expected to be an important determinant of domestic 
expenditure. Higher prices increase household wealth and thus may raise private 
consumption. And, naturally, they represent an incentive for corporate investment. To the 
extent that they respond to variations in capital flows, share prices can therefore perform 
the role of transmission channel. Table 4 shows that, in effect, there is a positive 
correlation between KANDI and the stock market price index (SPI). During the band 
period, the link was strong and highly significant; after the shift to float, however, there is 
a reduction in its size and statistical significance. The implication is that the role of SPI as 
transmission channel may have lost intensity during the floating period. 
The introduction of SPI as an additional regressor in the consumption and investment 
equations yields results that are basically in accordance with what could be expected 
(see equation 7 in Tables 5 and 6). First, SPI is a highly significant (in a statistical 
sense) determinant of consumption and investment. The effect is also meaningful in 
                                                 
20  The causality between inflation and capital flows can run both ways; it seems unlikely, though, that 
capital flows would respond to merely short-term variations in the inflation rate (recall that variables 
in Table 4 have been de-trended). Lower inflation may signal macroeconomic stability and thus attract 
capital flows, but larger capital flows may increase the inflation rate by its effect on the money supply 
and generally on domestic aggregate demand. However, they can have a disinflationary effect by 
increasing the real wage (through a real currency appreciation), and moderating the demands for a rise 
in nominal wages; see Ibarra (2003) for an empirical examination.   17
economic terms: it can be calculated that, during the band period, a one standard 
deviation in SPI tended to increase consumption in 3.7 per cent and investment in 7.3 
per cent. Note again that the effect is stronger on investment than on consumption, as 
was the case with the real exchange rate. 
Second, share prices have been an important transmission channel for capital flows. 
Again, the evidence here follows the pattern detected before for the real exchange rate, 
in the sense that such role appears to have been stronger in the band than in the floating 
period. In particular, during the band period the KANDI coefficient becomes 
insignificantly different from zero for both consumption and investment; during the 
floating period, in contrast, the coefficient falls to about a half in the consumption 
equation, but does not change much in the investment equation (compare equations 2 
and 7 in Tables 5 and 6). This result, which is consistent with the observed fall in the 
correlation coefficient between KANDI and SPI, implies that share prices had ceased to 
be a significant channel from capital flows to investment already in the initial stage of 
the floating regime. 
Other transmission channels. It has often been argued that fiscal policy in developing 
countries tends to be pro-cyclical: the budget deficit expands with capital inflows and 
economic activity, taking advantage of relatively abundant sources of funds, and goes 
down in tandem with capital flows to minimize the impact on the government's 
credibility among investors (see Eatwell and Taylor 2002). Table 4 shows that the fiscal 
deficit in Mexico (GOVD) has been positively correlated with (lagged) capital flows in 
the recent period. 
The coefficient on the (lagged) fiscal deficit is statistically significant, but negatively 
signed, in both the consumption and investment equations (see equation 8 in Tables 5 
and 6).21 22 This implies the deficit has a contractionary effect on these two components 
of aggregate demand. In consequence, if a rise in capital flows is followed by a greater 
fiscal deficit, this will actually tend to curb the capital flows' positive effect on 
demand.23 More important for our present purposes, though, is the fact that the 
inclusion of GOVD as an additional regressor does not have an important influence on 
either the size or the statistical significance of the KANDI coefficients (even during the 
floating period, contrary to our initial expectation). This evidence is consistent with the 
idea that fiscal policy is too slow to react to quarterly variations in capital flows, in 
order to make any substantial difference for the latter's macroeconomic impact. 
                                                 
21  Note the result for the test of normal residuals is not entirely satisfactory in the investment equation. 
22  In a related result, Gupta et al. (2001) found that output growth in a large sample of countries tended 
to be stronger in the two years following a currency crisis, if the adjustment program included a 
tightening of fiscal policy. 
23  It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate the possible reasons for the observed contractionary 
effect of the budget deficit on private demand. We may note, however, that if both the nominal 
interest rate (lagged or contemporaneous) and the lagged government deficit are included in the 
consumption equation, then the deficit coefficient (but not the interest rate's) becomes statistically 
insignificant. In contrast, if the interest rate is included twice lagged (i.e., predetermined in relation to 
the fiscal deficit), then both variables remain significant. These results indicate that the contractionary 
effect of the budget deficit may be linked to its effect on domestic interest rates. Note, however, that a 
similar effect cannot be found in the investment equation including the real interest rate and the 
budget deficit.   18
Generally speaking, capital flows can be expected to affect domestic monetary 
aggregates, as mentioned at the beginning of this sub-section, although the effect may 
depend on the choice of exchange rate regime. In the present case, Table 4 shows that 
both the money base and M1 have been positively correlated with non-FDI flows 
throughout our two reference periods. 24 25 Again, this provides the basis for a possible 
role of monetary aggregates as transmission channels. 
The inclusion of the money base in the consumption equation yields mixed results (see 
equation 9 in Table 5). As expected, the new variable presents a statistically significant, 
positively signed coefficient. However, its inclusion has no noticeable impact on the 
KANDI coefficients, in either economic or statistical terms. In other words, the money 
supply does not seem to have performed a role as transmission channel for capital flows 
in any of the periods.26 
Finally, GDP is included as a regressor in the initial consumption and investment 
equations, as a summary of all possible influences from capital flows as they are 
captured in overall economic activity levels (see equation 10 in Table 5 and equation 9 
in Table 6). As expected, the inclusion of GDP induces a fall in the size of the KANDI 
coefficients. In the case of consumption, the reduction is of about 24 per cent for the 
band period and 34 per cent under the float; despite this fall, the coefficient remains 
statistically significant in both periods. In the case of investment, the reduction is larger 
during the band (about a half), while the coefficient stops being statistically significant 
in the floating period. 
4 Conclusions 
After the economic crisis of 1994-1995 and the adoption of a floating exchange rate 
regime, foreign capital flows to Mexico, other than FDI, have been relatively small (on 
a cumulative basis) but very volatile. In fact, on a given quarter they can be as large as 
FDI. In consequence, although they have not been a significant source of permanent 
external resources for the country, non-FDI flows are a potential factor of 
macroeconomic instability. This raises the issue of their possible transmission to the real 
side of the economy, and thus represents a clear test for the operation of the floating 
system. Is there any evidence of insulation brought about by the new regime? 
The volatility of aggregate consumption and investment has risen together with that of 
capital flows. In parallel, the effect of (lagged) changes in non-FDI flows on 
consumption has intensified during the floating period. This supports the idea that the 
volatility of capital flows is a significant factor behind the observed behaviour of 
consumption. In contrast, the effect of capital flows on domestic investment has tended 
to disappear. 
                                                 
24  The correlation with M1 fell after the adoption of the floating regime, possibly as a reflection of the 
greater monetary autonomy associated to the regime switch. In contrast, the correlation with the 
money base has remained largely unchanged. 
25  Unexpectedly, it was not possible to find a significant link with a broader aggregate, such as M2. 
26  Similar results obtain with the inclusion of M1 (twice lagged). None of the monetary aggregates was a 
significant regressor in the investment equation.   19
By their nature, non-FDI flows do not affect aggregate demand directly but rather 
through the intermediation of domestic financial markets. This may lead to the 
emergence of different types of channels for the transmission of capital flows to 
domestic demand. In the case of Mexico, some of the expected channels, such as the 
real exchange rate and stock prices, have been important; others, like the interest rate, 
the budget deficit and different monetary aggregates, have not. 
The real exchange rate and stock prices have been very significant (in economic terms) 
determinants of consumption and investment demand. The correlation of those two 
variables with non-FDI flows declined after the peso was allowed to float; this implies 
that their role as transmission channels has become weaker. Together, these two 
observations help to explain the observed tendency of domestic investment to become 
detached from short-run fluctuations in capital flows. 
Although this offers a plausible interpretation for the behaviour of investment, it’s 
worth keeping in mind that the weak correlation of these two variables with foreign 
capital flows in the recent period is not likely to be explained by the introduction of the 
floating regime itself. This is particularly clear in the case of the real exchange rate, 
which probably has been less correlated with capital flows, not because of the flexibility 
of the nominal rate, but rather due to the high contemporaneous correlation between 
capital flows and the variation in the stock of international reserves at the central bank; 
in other words, despite the flexibility of the exchange rate, the stock of international 
reserves has performed as a sort of macroeconomic bumper. In fact, given the strong 
effect of the real exchange rate on domestic demand, the floatation itself probably tends 
to increase aggregate demand volatility.27 
In the case of stock prices, the recently observed disconnection with lagged changes in 
capital flows may have to do with the much smaller size of foreign investment in the 
stock market after the adoption of floating. During the period characterized by a semi-
fixed exchange rate system, foreign investment in the stock market had a quarterly mean 
value of 1.489 billions of dollars, with a maximum value of 6.257 billions and a 
standard deviation of 1.452 billions. In contrast, during the floating period (not 
considering 1995) the average level of investment was only 0.423 billions, with a 
maximum of 2.238 and standard deviation of 0.823. 
There is the further question of why only investment, but not consumption, has become 
increasingly detached from foreign capital flows. Part of the answer may be that 
investment is much more sensitive than consumption to variations in the real exchange 
rate and stock prices, thus receiving a larger benefit from the weaker response of these 
two variables to capital flow fluctuations in the recent period. But clearly this cannot 
explain why consumption has become more sensitive to variations in capital flows.28 
This is a question that is left open for future research. 
                                                 
27 This is a topic of current debate. Gosh et al. (2003), Ffrench-Davis and Larraín (2002), and Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001) present cross country evidence that the volatility of output (levels or 
growth rates) tends to be relatively high among countries with a system of fixed exchange rate. Other 
studies, such as Baxter and Stockman (1989), and Flood and Rose (1995) have failed to uncover a 
robust connection between exchange regime and macroeconomic performance. See Duarte (2003) for 
a discussion. 
28  Even after controlling for the effect of GDP on consumption.   20
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